Municipal Broadband Planning Tends to be Biased. Consider Willmar, MN.
Two Kinds of Bias
Most people expect their representatives in local government to make informed decisions when considering how best to invest taxpayer resources. But what if city officials failed to do their due diligence before committing to a project that would require the assumption of tens of millions of dollars in debt? What if they locked in on a particular outcome from the very start, overlooking warning signs and failing to consider all perspectives on the issue?
This dynamic has long been evident in the context of municipal broadband planning. Indeed, a defining characteristic of deliberations involving these projects is that they tend to be influenced by two kinds of bias: survivor bias and confirmation bias.
Survivor bias arises when decision-making processes are informed only by the “winners.” Omitted from these deliberations are examples of “losers” or failed attempts at achieving what is being considered. In the municipal broadband context, this manifests when local officials give more weight to examples of government-owned broadband networks that have not failed and give less weight or dismiss examples of struggling or failed municipal broadband projects.
This feeds into confirmation bias, which is when decision-makers seek information that supports a particular outcome. This might happen when a city itself or a particular official or staffer stakes a lot on a municipal broadband project and, consciously or not, becomes all-in on the project. As a result, they are more likely to seek information and data that support that outcome, and skeptical or dismissive of indications it may not be a good idea.
The result is a survivor/confirmation bias feedback loop that yields an incomplete and analytically flawed view of how municipal broadband projects generally fare.
Over the next few months, the ACLP will comprehensively examine and offer ideas for countering bias in the context of municipal broadband decision-making. Our goal is to ensure that local decision-making is as informed, comprehensive, and unbiased as possible. In the meantime, we wanted to offer a timely and illustrative example of these dynamics at work.
Willmar, MN: Welcome to the “Monkey House”
In mid-May, city officials in Willmar, MN, marked the “groundbreaking for Willmar Connect — a city-owned, citywide broadband network.” This $8.2 million initiative, Phase 1 of a multi-phase plan, represented the culmination of several years of discussion about whether the city should invest in building its own broadband network.
Ahead of a key vote in the lead-up to the groundbreaking, one city councilor voiced his objection to certain cost elements of the project by saying, “we’re so deep in the monkey house that we don’t know what stinks anymore.” This reflected his frustration with constant changes to the underlying financial requirements and estimates of the project, as well as staff coming back to the council multiple times asking for additional funds for consultants and other vendors.
In other words, the council had spent so much time in the “monkey house” that it didn’t know what fresh air smelled like anymore. Instead, they had become inured to living with and inhaling a smell that would otherwise cause them to recoil.
How did this happen? A closer look at the city’s discussions about whether to pursue the broadband project, which began in 2022, reveals numerous instances of the survivor/confirmation bias feedback loop described above, influencing and pushing the decision-making process toward a favored outcome.
Locked in From the Start
From the very beginning, city officials locked in on a specific outcome: a municipally owned open access fiber network, something that had never been pursued in Minnesota. To justify the viability of this kind of network, officials reached out to counterparts in Lehi City, UT, and Bloomington, IN, which were pursuing similar projects. However, at that time, neither city had actually built an open access network. That they were considering this kind of network and taking steps to deploy them seemed to be sufficient for officials in Willmar to hold them up as winners.
Unfortunately, officials in Willmar failed to take a hard look at the nuances of these projects, opting instead to highlight superficial similarities while overlooking profound but important differences.
At that time, Bloomington was still evaluating an open access network, one that would be built, owned, and operated by Meridiam, a private entity. Meridiam came to town promising to build the network at no cost to the city; however, to facilitate deployment, the firm sought a variety of concessions. Meridiam ultimately agreed to invest $50M in the network; the city will contribute $1M for digital equity purposes. Financial and operational risk is primarily on Meridiam as the network’s owner, distinguishing it from the city-led efforts in Willmar.
The open access network in Lehi City was in its very early stages when Willmar examined it (groundbreaking occurred in September 2022). The network there was completed in October 2025; the take-rate was 27% as of December 2025.
Officials in Willmar also looked to UTOPIA, another open access system in Utah, for guidance. The city hired two firms with connections to UTOPIA – a consulting firm to vet open access proposals, and a law firm with experience in bonding – to assist with its broadband planning. UTOPIA, though, is hardly a role model. It struggled mightily for more than a decade to find its financial footing and teetered on the edge of failure several times. Even though it appears to have found a better financial model of late, it is still carrying over $700M in debt nearly a quarter of a century after its launch.
It also appears that decision-makers in Willmar did not look closely at or take seriously failed attempts at building municipal open access broadband networks.
It seems officials in Willmar did not study the failed network in Provo, UT. There, city officials attempted to build an open access fiber network, but the project encountered significant financial difficulties. In the end, the city sold the network to Google Fiber for $1, leaving residents to pay back $40M in debt.
There have also been numerous failed municipal broadband projects in Minnesota. It is unclear if officials in Willmar considered them during their decision-making process. Failed projects in the state occurred in Alexandria, Cross Lake, and Lake County. There have also been consistent financial struggles surrounding the muni broadband network in Monticello. In addition, a multi-locality cooperative, RS Fiber, which has built an extensive fiber system, has considered selling its network in the recent past (it appears that, as of early 2026, the initiative was able to secure “improved loan terms” to help it continue forward). Questions by skeptical city council members in Willmar about the struggles in Monticello and RS Fiber were reframed positively by other city officials and staff.
Entering the Monkey House
Formal decisions in furtherance of the Willmar project accelerated in 2025. The following timeline of recent events highlights the many changes made to core aspects of the project in just a few months – changes that did little to delay the city’s push towards finalizing its muni broadband project.
October 2025
- Phase 1 approved at an estimated cost of $7.8M.
- RFP issued with bids due by early December.
December 2025
January 2026
- The city engaged the next lowest bidder, NC3, which came in at $7.6M. However, that bid was eventually “rescinded after [NC3] informed the city they no longer had the financial and operational capacity to do the project.”
- In discussing the bonds needed to finance the project, the city noted that “a projected financial shortfall that reflects early-phase construction costs prior to full system scale and revenue stabilization is estimated to be [$3.6M] over 16 years.” This marked a significant change to the city’s financial projections included in its previous pro forma from March 2025, which indicated that the broadband system would generate positive net income almost from the start.
- To offset this 16-year deficit, city staff argued that Willmar would likely have to levy a property tax increase of 2.8%. City staff used that potential tax increase to frame two paths forward: (1) tap into another city fund to offset the deficit, or (2) vote to authorize Phase 2 of the project, which, city staff argued, would make the economics of the entire project more favorable.
- Around this time, it was reported that a private ISP had approached the city about deploying fiber in most of Willmar but “not connect all properties, particularly those in lower-density or geographically challenging areas where cost is a prohibitive factor, without public assistance.” Available materials did not say how much that “public assistance” would have amounted to. The city opted not to pursue this potential partnership.
March 2026
- The city engaged the third lowest bidder, Kramer Service Group, which came in at $8.2M. It was awarded the project in early March.
- The city also revised the scope of Phase 1. It indicated that it would remove serving its Industrial Park from Phase 1, thereby allowing it to reduce the cost of Phase 1 by $1.5M to $6.7M. This occurred because of a “pending industrial park grant that includes fiber.”
- Excluding the Park is notable for two reasons. First, lack of fiber in that area sparked initial muni broadband discussions in 2022. However, it is unclear whether and when the city will receive the grant to bring fiber to the park.
- Second, in early 2025, Charter Communications, which already provides broadband to much of the city, indicated that it would deploy fiber to the Park. In response, several council members moved to stop the muni broadband initiative. A majority of the council, though, voted against that measure.
- The city also changed the take-rate needed to achieve breakeven for the project from 40% to 46%. This is a significant change that reflects the volatile economics of muni broadband. Based on a review of planning documents, the city did not offer a rationale or evidence in support of setting the take rate at either 40% or 46%.
The Stories We Tell
Throughout the decision-making process in Willmar, much of the research, data, and support for the proposed open access fiber network was sourced from entities that advocate for or profit from municipal broadband. Many of the resources provided by these entities are highly curated, providing local officials with a sanitized view of the track record municipal broadband. For example, a widely cited map of community broadband networks in the U.S. omits the dozens of muni broadband projects that have failed over the last few decades. In other words, the map only includes “winners,” feeding into the survivor bias that tends to skew these decision-making processes.
Important parameters of the project also changed. For example, the city shifted from using revenue bonds for the proposed project to general obligation tax abatement bonds (GOBs). Initially, officials framed revenue bonds as the optimal route for the city because it would insulate taxpayers from financial risk in the case of financial struggle or failure. Now, the city will use GOBs, which are ultimately backstopped by local property taxes. If the network struggles or fails, property taxes will go up.
In addition, the city passed on several opportunities to partner with private ISPs to achieve its connectivity goals. It could have partnered with Charter to serve the Industrial Park; it voted against the proposal. Another ISP, a new entrant to the local market, would have served almost the entire city and could have reached everyone with the support of the city; it passed on the proposal.
At the same time, key elements of the financial projections surrounding the project – from estimated break-even dates to needed take-rates – have shifted in fundamental ways.
In sum, it appears that the city has been locked in on a particular outcome – building and owning a municipal open access fiber network – from the very beginning, yielding a skewed decision-making framework and highlighting the many ways that the survivor/confirmation bias feedback loop can help officials reach a pre-determined or preferred outcome.